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The fifth edition  of the NBER Macroeconomics  Annual  1990 contains six 
papers.  Three deal with  topics  in the news.  Robert J. Barro and Xavier 
Sala-i-Martin examine  world  interest  rates, and offer an explanation  for 
the high  real interest  rates of the  1980s. Francesco Giavazzi and Marco 
Pagano look at the macroeconomic  effects of recent European fiscal stabi- 
lizations.  And  Gur Ofer discusses  macroeconomic  issues  in Soviet  re- 
form. Two papers  deal with  important  topics  at the interface of macro- 
and labor economics.  Steven  J. Davis  and John Haltiwanger  use  a new 
micro-data  base on firms' employment  to study  the cyclical behavior of 
job creation  and  job  destruction.  Mark Bils considers  the  behavior  of 
employment  and wages  under labor contracts that largely predetermine 
wages.  The final paper,  by Giuseppe  Bertola and Ricardo J. Caballero, 
explores  new  directions  of  research,  with  a  characterization  of  the 
macroeconomic  implications  of infrequent  adjustments  at the microeco- 
nomic level.  We limit ourselves  in this introduction  to brief descriptions 
of the papers; an important  contribution  of the conference,  however,  is 
in the formal and informal comments  that follow  each paper. 
To the  pessimists,  the  high  real interest  rates of the  1980s were  the 
unavoidable  implication of large government  deficits; to the optimists,  the 
high real rates were  a signal  of good  times to come,  of high anticipated 
profits.  In  their  paper,  "World Real Interest  Rates,"  Barro and  Sala-i- 
Martin review  the evidence,  then develop  a framework of interpretation 
and use it to provide a coherent,  quantitative,  picture of the movement  in 
real interest rates and their determinants. 
First, they  rightly  argue  that,  even  if the  goal  is  to  understand  the 
1980s,  one  should  look  at that  period  in  the  context  of  a longer  time 
period.  They therefore  concentrate  on the behavior of real interest rates 2 *  BLANCHARD  & FISCHER 
over the last 30 years.  Second,  in a bold simplifying  stroke, they decide 
to focus primarily on "world real interest rates," and to think of them as 
being  determined  by the  equality  between  world  saving  and world  in- 
vestment.  Based partly on data considerations,  and partly on the degree 
of capital market integration  between  countries,  they define the "world" 
as composed  of nine  OECD countries,  the Group of 7 countries  minus 
Italy, but plus  Sweden,  Belgium,  and the Netherlands. 
They start by constructing  a world real interest rate series, constructed 
as  a weighted  average  of  each  country's  short  nominal  rate minus  a 
forecast of inflation,  obtained  by time-series  forecasting.  They confirm 
that real rates were indeed  high in the 1980s, 3.5% compared to 0.4% in 
the 1970s and 2.0% in the 1960s. 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin then sketch a model of saving and investment 
along  neoclassical  lines.  They  assume  saving  to be  a function  of  real 
interest rates and of temporary income,  and suggest  taking the price of 
oil  as  an  index  of  temporary  income.  They  take  investment  to  be  a 
function of the market value of capital. While they recognize  that market 
value is in turn a function  of fundamental  factors-expected  profits and 
user costs-their  strategy  is to take it as a proximate determinant,  and 
leave  the  next  step  to  future  research.  This  leads  them  to  estimate  a 
reduced  form  relation  for real rates with  two  basic  determinants,  the 
market value  of capital and the price of oil. While Barro has in the past 
argued that neither  deficits nor money  should  have significant effect on 
real interest  rates,  much  of the  discussion  in the  1980s focused  on  the 
Volcker-Thatcher disinflation  and later on,  on the Reagan deficits. Thus, 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, in an eclectic mood,  allow also for money, mea- 
sured as M1, and for fiscal policy, measured  by a number of alternative 
variables, as determinants  of saving,  and thus of real interest rates in the 
reduced  form. 
Their next step is to estimate  the reduced  form relations for real rates 
and investment.  They find a strong positive  effect of both the price of oil 
and stock market returns on real rates. More surprisingly  to them,  they 
find a strong  effect  of changes  in money;  they  are, however,  unable  to 
find much effect of fiscal policy, measured  either by the ratio of cyclically 
adjusted deficits to GNP, or by the ratio of debt to GNP, or by the ratio of 
government  consumption  to GNP. The strong positive  relation between 
stock market returns and real interest  rates is of particular interest.  In a 
world  dominated  by  shifts  in  savings,  one  would  instead  expect  the 
market to  go  down  as  interest  rates went  up; the  positive  relation is, 
therefore, prima facie evidence  of a major role of shifts in the investment 
schedule. 
Equipped  with  their estimated  reduced-form  relation, Barro and Sala- Editorial  3 
i-Martin provide  their interpretation  of why  real rates were  high  in the 
1980s. Of the  4% increase  in rates between  1975-80  and  1981-86,  they 
attribute 2.5% to the increase in the stock market, 1.9% to the increase in 
the price of oil, and only  .3% to tight money. Thus, they come out on net 
on the side  of optimists,  attributing much of the rise in interest rates to 
perceptions  of good  times  to come. 
The rest of the  paper  is spent  estimating  the  saving  and investment 
schedules,  using  the stock market returns and the price of oil as identify- 
ing  instruments,  and  looking  at saving,  investment,  and  real interest 
rates  in  individual  countries.  Under  the  hypothesis  of  perfect  capital 
mobility, real interest  rates should  not  depend  on country-specific  fac- 
tors, but investment,  saving  and thus the current account should.  Their 
results suggest  a dominant  role of world  factors in the determination  of 
real interest rates in nearly all countries. 
The paper by Barro and Sala-i-Martin will not leave many readers indif- 
ferent.  It is bold  and  forthcoming  in its choice  of assumptions,  and its 
statement  of  conclusions.  Few  readers  will  accept  all features  of  the 
model,  all identifying  assumptions,  and all conclusions.  But in all cases, 
this should be an encouragement  to improve and extend the analysis, and 
to make  progress  on  one  of the  central questions  in macroeconomics. 
In  "Can Severe  Fiscal  Contractions  Be Expansionary?  Tales of  Two 
Small European Countries,"  Francesco Giavazzi and Marco Pagano con- 
trast the  standard  Keynesian  view  that  budget  deficit  reductions  are 
contractionary with the so-called  "German view" that a fiscal contraction 
can, through  its effects  on expectations,  lead to an expansion  in aggre- 
gate  demand.  They  argue  that  the  German  view  is  most  likely  to  be 
correct if the fiscal stabilization is brought about through a cut in govern- 
ment consumption  that is perceived  to be permanent,  and which  there- 
fore carries with it the expectation  of lower future taxes. 
Because most European countries undertook  fiscal stabilizations in the 
1980s,  Giavazzi  and  Pagano  expect  to  find  evidence  in  the  European 
experience.  There is mild  support  in a cross-country  regression  for the 
view  that private  consumption  increases  when  government  consump- 
tion  decreases,  but  rather than  pursue  the  issue  on  a cross-sectional, 
multicountry  basis,  the authors elect to seek lessons  in the experience  of 
two  countries  that  undertook  particularly  severe  fiscal  contractions-- 
Denmark,  and Ireland, which  tried to stabilize twice. 
The  1982 Danish  stabilization  provides  strong  a  priori evidence  to 
support the German view: a decrease  in the budget  deficit by more than 
10% of GDP, accounted  for in part by a decline in government  consump- 
tion of 2.8% of GDP, was  followed  by an increase  in both  private con- 4 *  BLANCHARD  & FISCHER 
sumption  and investment.  The first Irish fiscal stabilization attempt pro- 
duced a recession  and failed, while  the second  succeeded,  growth being 
restored  within  two  years.  Both countries  fixed  their currencies  to the 
Deutschmark  at the  time  of the  successful  stabilization,  and both  had 
undertaken  real devaluations  in advance  of the stabilization. 
Giavazzi  and Pagano  concentrate  on the effects of the fiscal stabiliza- 
tion  on  consumption  demand.  They identify  several  channels  through 
which  changes  in fiscal policy  can affect consumption:  (1) the conven- 
tional  Keynesian  channel,  whereby  consumption  falls because  dispos- 
able income  falls; (2) capital gains that accrue on either private assets  or 
government  debt  as  a  result  of  declines  in  inflation  and  real interest 
rates; (3) substitution  of private for public consumption  (e.g.,  when  the 
government  cuts spending  on education,  the private sector may increase 
its educational  spending);  and (4) expectations  of reduced  future taxes. 
The  most  striking  difference  between  Ireland  and  Denmark  is  that 
asset values  rose sharply in Denmark at the time of stabilization,  along 
with consumer  confidence,  whereas  asset values  did not rise in Ireland. 
This difference  in the behavior  of wealth  helps  account for some  of the 
differences in consumption  behavior in the Danish and Irish cases. How- 
ever, after providing  econometric  estimates  of the magnitude  of the first 
three  effects,  Giavazzi  and  Pagano  still find  a substantial  unexplained 
residual in consumption  in both countries.  They are inclined to attribute 
this in part to the effects  of expectations-though  of course some  of the 
expectational  effects  are already  taken  into  account  when  changes  in 
asset values  are considered. 
Any  fiscal stabilization  is expected  to cut real interest rates, and thus 
should  through  that  channel  raise  investment  spending.  Investment, 
however,  is bound  to be affected also by expectations  of future demand. 
Giavazzi and Pagano show  that the decline in interest rates in Denmark 
was insufficient  to account  for the investment  surge in that country, but 
do not otherwise  pursue  the sources of differences in investment  behav- 
ior in the two countries. 
This paper makes a strong case that a well-executed  fiscal stabilization 
can within  a short time lead to an increase in aggregate demand,  and it 
suggests  the circumstances  in which this may happen.  Several issues  are 
left  for future  research;  in  particular, the  authors  clearly  suspect  that 
monetary and especially  exchange-rate policies played an important role 
in the successful  stabilizations  and in the expansionary  impact of fiscal 
stabilization. 
In their paper,  "Gross Job Creation and  Destruction:  Microeconomic 
Evidence  and  Macroeconomic  Implications,"  Steven  J. Davis  and John Editorial 5 
Haltiwanger examine the cyclical behavior of job creation and destruction 
in U.S. manufacturing.  They bring to this investigation  a new and impor- 
tant  data  set,  which  traces  the  movement  in  employment  in  approxi- 
mately  160,000 manufacturing  establishments  over a period of 15 years, 
1972 to 1986. And  the investigation  yields  a number of clear, new  facts 
which  will affect the way we  think both about growth and fluctuations. 
The data set they put together  comes  from the Longitudinal  Research 
Datafile,  which  is a series  of five-year  panels  of data on manufacturing 
establishments,  and Census-year  data. The panel data include nearly all 
large establishments,  sample  medium-size  establishments,  and exclude 
establishments  with  less  than  five  employees.  The  sample  represents 
approximately  75% of total manufacturing  employment.  From this data 
set,  Davis  and  Haltiwanger  then  construct  "job creation" and  "job de- 
struction" measures  as the sum  across firms of positive' changes  in em- 
ployment  and the sum across firms of negative  changes  in employment, 
respectively.  They  construct  both  quarterly and  annual  measures,  and 
do so for both aggregate  manufacturing  as well as for industries at the 2- 
digit  level.  Their measures  of job  creation  and  destruction  are clearly 
much  superior  to any we  had earlier; they fall short of their conceptual 
counterpart only in that they net out job creation and destruction  at the 
firm level. 
Using those  series,  Davis and Haltiwanger first find high average rates 
of job creation and destruction,  an observation  consistent  with the find- 
ing  of  high  flows  in  and  out  of  employment  from the  work  on  gross 
flows  of workers.  The annual  rates of job creation and  destruction  for 
that  period-during  which  manufacturing  employment  decreased  on 
net-are  9.2% and 11.3%, respectively.  Thus, roughly  10% of the jobs in 
a given  year  did  not  exist  a year earlier, and  10% will not  exist a year 
later. High  rates  of  creation-destruction  may  a priori be  the  result  of 
quick ups  and  downs  in  employment  at the  firm level,  or instead  of 
stable patterns  of employment  growth  or decline  across firms. The evi- 
dence  points  to persistence  in job creation and destruction:  68% of the 
jobs created are still there a year later, 81% of the jobs destroyed  are still 
missing  a year later. 
Davis  and  Haltiwanger  then  turn  to  the  cyclical  behavior  of  job 
creation-destruction.  They find the data to have two clear characteristics. 
First, job creation  and  job destruction  move  mostly  in opposite  direc- 
tions.  The  correlation  between  annual  job creation  and  destruction  is 
equal to -.86;  it is lower at the quarterly level,  equal to only  -.22.  Thus, 
not surprisingly,  expansions  are times  when  more jobs are created and 
less jobs are destroyed.  This will not come as a surprise to the majority of 
economists,  but  the  second  result may. Much of the movement  in em- 6 *  BLANCHARD  & FISCHER 
ployment  comes  from  variations  in job destruction  rather than  in job 
creation. Expansions  are not so much times when  more jobs are created 
as times when  less jobs are destroyed.  Davis and Haltiwanger  prefer an 
alternative, but equivalent  description  of the same findings,  namely that 
expansions  are  associated  with  a  lower  intensity  of  job  reallocation. 
Thus,  higher  job creation associated  with  the expansion  is partly offset 
by  lower  job  creation  associated  with  the  decrease  in  intensity.  And 
lower  job  destruction  associated  with  the  expansion  is  reinforced  by 
lower job destruction  associated  with  the decrease in intensity. 
On  the  basis  of those  cyclical findings,  Davis  and  Haltiwanger  then 
develop  a theory before returning in a more formal way to the facts. The 
model  is a real business  cycle model  with  a heterogenous  labor market, 
but enough  insurance  that the outcome  is the same as that of a centrally 
planned  economy.  There  are two  types  of  shocks,  aggregate  and  allo- 
cative.  Aggregate  shocks  tend  to move  job creation and job destruction 
in opposite  directions,  but  also  affect the  intensity  of reallocation.  Be- 
cause reallocation takes time, it is optimal to do more of it in times of low 
activity, when  the opportunity  cost is lower. Allocative disturbances are 
instead likely to move job destruction  and creation in the same direction, 
although  with job creation lagging  destruction. 
Davis and Haltiwanger  then return to the data, using a just identified 
vector  autoregression  approach  to  the  time  series  for job creation and 
destruction.  The  identification  restrictions  are  that  aggregate  distur- 
bances should  affect job creation and destruction  in opposite  directions, 
and allocative disturbances  should  affect them in the same direction, but 
with  job destruction  responding  more  initially than job creation.  Their 
conclusion  is  that  allocative  and  aggregate  innovations  account  about 
equally  for  the  movement  in  creation  or  destruction.  Except  at  long 
horizons,  however,  aggregate  disturbances  account  for the bulk of the 
difference between  the two,  for the change in employment  itself. 
This is another  paper  that covers  a lot of new  ground,  empirical and 
theoretical,  and reaches  strong conclusions.  There is little question  that 
much  has  been  learned  from  this  first pass  at a new  data  set.  Many 
readers will  object to various  aspects  of the particular model  that Davis 
and Haltiwanger  sketch in their paper. The two cyclical facts they have 
identified  will remain. 
Predetermined  nominal wages,  set for instance in long-term labor con- 
tracts, have  long  been  argued  to provide  a fulcrum for monetary  policy 
to affect real output.  In "Wage and Employment  Patterns in Long-Term 
Contracts  When  Labor Is Quasi-Fixed,"  Mark Bils uses  labor contract 
data previously  examined  by Wayne Vroman to shed light on the nature Editorial 7 
of  labor  contracts  and  their  implications  for  wage  and  employment. 
Wages set in long-term  labor contracts clearly rise more rapidly relative 
to  other  wages  at  the  beginning  of  the  contract,  and  then  rise  more 
slowly  than  other  wages  for the  remainder  of the  contract.  The initial 
wage rise seems  to take place almost in step fashion in the first quarter of 
most contracts. 
If labor contracts take the form that the union  sets the wage and firms 
set employment,  then there should be a corresponding pattern of employ- 
ment over the life of a contract: employment  should  rise over the life of 
contracts. In fact though,  employment  growth is typically highest  at the 
beginning  of a labor contract, and declines  over the life of the contract. 
If the simplest  labor contracting model  does  not explain the joint pat- 
tern of wages  and  employment,  what  does?  Bils develops  a model  in 
which firms face costs of adjusting labor, and in which there is therefore 
a concern by firms that add labor late in a contract that their bargaining 
position  in the next contract will be weakened.  This introduces  an addi- 
tional factor that should  mitigate the effect on employment  of a declining 
real wage  over the contract period.  In the linear-quadratic model  devel- 
oped  by Bils, however,  it would  not reverse  the presumption  that em- 
ployment  should  rise over the life of the contract. 
Bils tests  many  aspects  of his revised  model,  including,  for instance, 
the implication  that employment  would  be more likely to rise over the 
life of a contract in an industry  in which  a single labor union  negotiates 
with  many  competitive  firms  than  in an industry  where  a union  con- 
fronts  few  employers.  The  argument  is  that  an  individual  firm in  an 
industry with many other employers  pays less attention to the effects of 
its actions on future wages  than would  a single employer. 
It is fair to say that the data reject the basic model  proposed  by Bils. 
But this  paper  also  confirms  that model  rejections  may  be  even  more 
useful  than  nonrejections.  The  paper  presents  a clear set  of facts that 
have  to be explained,  undertakes  an impressive  amount  of further em- 
pirical work,  and shows  that a standard model,  and a suggestive  exten- 
sion, will not explain the joint pattern of wages  and employment  in labor 
contracts.  It therefore  poses  a clear challenge  to researchers  to explain 
the facts, and to subject their explanations  to as searching a set of tests as 
Bils does  in his paper. 
Many of the decisions  we  take entail costs.  The costs associated  with 
buying  or selling  a house  or a car, buying  a new  machine  or hiring  a 
new  worker,  for example,  are often  substantial.  Economists  have  long 
recognized  the  existence  of  those  costs,  usually  formalizing  them  as 
convex  costs,  which  lead  to  a  slow  adjustment  of  the  actual  to  the 8 *  BLANCHARD  & FISCHER 
desired  stock.  But most  of the  costs  we  actually incur are not  convex. 
Selling  a car, for example,  may  entail  a fixed  cost,  as well  as  propor- 
tional costs; the average  cost is likely to decrease,  not increase with  the 
value of the car. 
Until recently, progress on characterizing the behavior of individuals in 
the presence  of fixed and proportional costs,  has been slow. And results 
on the behavior of aggregates  in the presence of such costs at the individ- 
ual level were nearly nonexistent.  This has changed in the last few years, 
and knowledge  to date is summarized  and substantially extended  in the 
paper,  "Kinked Adjustment  Costs  and  Aggregate  Dynamics,"  by Giu- 
seppe  Bertola and Ricardo J. Caballero. Because the adjustment function 
is kinked at the point  of no change,  they refer to such costs as "kinked 
costs." The paper has three distinct conceptual parts, the first characteriz- 
ing  optimal  individual  behavior,  the  second  dealing  with  aggregation, 
and the third being a first pass at estimating  the demand  for durables in 
the  United  States  as  coming  from  aggregation  of  individual  decisions 
under kinked costs. 
In the first part, Bertola and Caballero review the standard problem of 
optimal  behavior  in the presence  of both  fixed and proportional  costs, 
with  the exogenous  variable following  a Brownian motion.  The optimal 
rule in this case is a four-point  rule, (L,l,u,U) for z, the deviation  of the 
actual variable, x, from its desired  value,  x*. Whenever  z hits the lower 
bound  L, it is  returned  to  1; whenever  z hits  its upper  bound  U,  it is 
returned to u. This is, for the most part, well-traveled  ground; however, 
it will  serve  as  an  intuitive  but  rigorous  introduction  to  this  class  of 
problems,  and  in  the  process,  demystify  "smooth  pasting"  and  other 
"value matching" conditions.  Given the rule, one can derive the steady 
state distribution  of z, and thus the distribution of x, the actual decision 
variable.  This  distribution  is interesting,  but is not  what  is of primary 
interest to macroeconomists.  What we want to know  is the evolution  of 
the distribution  of x across individuals  over time. 
This takes Bertola and Caballero to the second  part of their paper, the 
behavior  of aggregates.  The interesting  question  is a simple  one: Does 
the fact that individuals  adjust infrequently imply that the aggregate will 
move  slowly? A general answer  has proven elusive.  Caplin and Spulber 
showed  in 1987 that infrequent  adjustment  could completely  disappear 
at the aggregate  level,  the aggregate  behaving  exactly as an individual 
would  have,  absent  adjustment  costs.  Caplin  and  Leahy  (1990) have 
shown  more recently  that infrequent  adjustment  could,  in another con- 
text,  lead  to  a zone  of  no  adjustment  at  the  aggregate  level  as  well. 
Bertola and  Caballero  show  that,  in  general,  the  answer  depends  on 
both the exact type  of rule used  by individuals  as well as on the ratio of Editorial  9 
idiosyncratic to aggregate  shocks.  Their main result is that the higher the 
ratio of idiosyncratic  to aggregate  shocks,  the more sluggish  will be the 
behavior of the aggregate. 
Finally, Bertola and Caballero show  how  such models  can actually be 
estimated  on  aggregate  data,  and  use  as  an  example  the  behavior  of 
expenditures  on aggregate  durables in the United States. Since Mankiw 
(1982), it has been  well  known  that the time series behavior  of durable 
expenditures  is at odds  with  the permanent  income  hypothesis,  absent 
adjustment  costs.  The permanent  hypothesis  implies  that durables con- 
sumption  should  follow  roughly  a random walk, and thus expenditures 
should be close to white  noise.  Expenditures,  however,  exhibit very high 
serial correlation.  The  model  estimated  by  Bertola and  Caballero does 
remarkably well  in fitting the data and the degree  of persistence  of the 
series.  It does  so with  reasonable  values  for the underlying  parameters. 
The parameters imply that consumers  wait until their stock is 25% below 
its target value  before adjusting,  and that aggregate  shocks  account for 
30% of the uncertainty  faced by consumers. 
The paper  represents  important  progress  in two  directions.  First, to- 
gether  with  other  recent  contributions,  it comes  close  to  cracking the 
aggregation  problem in the case of kinked costs. It shows  when  and how 
infrequent  individual  adjustment  can  lead  to  slow  aggregate  adjust- 
ment,  and  emphasizes  the role of the relative importance  of individual 
and aggregate  shocks.  Second,  it shows  that those models  have come of 
age,  to the point  where  they  can now  be estimated.  While the authors 
emphasize  that their results  should  be taken as exploratory, one  is im- 
pressed  at how  successful  this first attempt is. It will surely trigger much 
more work along  similar lines. 
While East European economies  begin  the process  of reform, most of 
them with  a clear idea of where  they want  to end up,  the Soviet Union 
has not yet made the fundamental  reform decisions.  In "Macroeconomic 
Issues  of Soviet  Reform,"  Gur Ofer first establishes  that the  economic 
situation  in  the  Soviet  Union  has  worsened  in  the  five  years  since 
Gorbachev came to power.  He analyzes  the sources of the worsening  of 
performance,  and  then  reviews  the  reform  options.  At  the  macro- 
economic  level,  most  of  the  deterioration  results  from an  increase  in 
government  spending,  especially  on  subsidies.  At  the  microeconomic 
level,  the deterioration results from a partial move to freeing up a system 
that is still heavily  monopolistic  and run by state control. 
Ofer describes  three reform options.  The first is a big bang approach, 
along Polish lines; in this option  macroeconomic  stabilization through a 
reduction  in the budget  deficit and  tightening  of credit and credit con- 10 *  BLANCHARD  & FISCHER 
straints is accompanied  by price and trade liberalization and as rapid a 
move  as possible  toward  private production.  The second  is the gradual 
restoration  of  macroeconomic  balance  along  with  attempts  to  correct 
shortages  through  improved  central direction,  using  resources freed up 
by  declining  defense  and  investment  spending.  The third is a macro- 
economic  stabilization  that  is  followed  by  the  gradual  introduction  of 
price reform and  industrial  restructuring.  The current leadership  is at- 
tempting  the second  option,  and perhaps planning  the third. 
Ofer rejects  the  big  bang  approach  as politically  infeasible  and  eco- 
nomically  inadvisable.  He does  not believe  the Soviet economy  has the 
institutions  in place to give such a reform an adequate chance of success, 
and  because  the  economy  is  so  large he  doubts  that trade reform can 
import  an  appropriate  price  system.  He  favors  a mixture  of  all three 
options: macroeconomic  stabilization accompanied  by a significant price 
reform (including  a devaluation)  that seeks  to move  prices toward equi- 
librium levels  but  does  not  free  them  to  seek  their own  levels;  at the 
same  time  the  government  should  institute  changes  in property  rights 
and begin  the  transformation  of ownership  and management  relations 
in the  economy.  Because  the initial price reform would  impose  signifi- 
cant costs  on many  individuals,  he argues that further democratization 
would  assist  the economic  reform process  by putting  in place a govern- 
ment that can call on the public to make the necessary  sacrifices. 
Ofer's  paper  gives  little  ground  for  optimism  about  the  near-term 
success  of Soviet  economic  reform, but it does  provide  the background 
information against which  future reform moves  can be appraised. 
The Conference  at which  these  papers were presented  and discussed 
was,  once  more,  remarkably well  organized  by Kirsten Foss  and  Ilana 
Hardesty. David  Cutler acted as editor of the papers and comments  and 
as rapporteur for the general discussion.  Also once more, his assistance 
was invaluable. 
Olivier Jean Blanchard and Stanley Fischer 